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INTRODUCTION
Setting: present day, a prison somewhere in the United States. The cam-
era focuses on a lone inmate, Sheila Thomas, passing time in her cell. The
soundtrack captures the dissonant rhythm of her sporadic coughing. The
camera pans across neighboring cells, showing twenty fellow inmates smok-
ing. Between them, the inmates simultaneously consume a pack of
cigarettes, filling the air with toxic chemicals. The scene shifts to the
prison's infirmary, where a line of inmates awaits medical treatment. Text
scrolls onto the screen: "Approximately 115 inmates die each year as a re-
sult of exposure to secondhand smoke. By contrast, in 2006, only 53
inmates were legally executed in the United States."'
* J.D. candidate, May 2008. I am grateful to Professors Richard Friedman, J.J. Prescott,
Mathias Reimann, and Gil Seinfeld for helpful suggestions, and especially to Professor David
Santacroce, my Note Editor, Ilya Shulman, and the Michigan Law Review Notes Office for invalu-
able editorial guidance.
I. Exposure to secondhand smoke causes the deaths of approximately 0.01667% of the U.S.
population annually. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF
INVOLUNTARY EXPOSURE TO TOBACCO SMOKE: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, at i (2006)
[hereinafter 2006 SURGEON GENERAL REPORT], available at http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/
secondhandsmoke/report/fullreport.pdf (attributing 49,430 annual deaths to exposure to secondhand
smoke); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE POPULATION FOR THE UNITED STATES,
REGIONS, STATES, AND FOR PUERTO Rico: APRIL 1, 2000 TO JULY 1, 2006 (2006), http://
www.census.gov/popest/states/NST-ann-est.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2007) (reporting a U.S.
population of 296,507,061 as of July 1, 2005). The twenty-one states that currently allow smoking
in some or all areas of their prisons, see infra notes 71-72 and accompanying text, housed 702,418
inmates as of June 30, 2005, PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
PRISON AND JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2005, at 3 tbl.2 (2006), available at http://
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/pjim05.pdf. Applying the death rate to the inmate population data
suggests that as many as 115 inmates die each year as a result of exposure to secondhand smoke. By
contrast, only fifty-three U.S. inmates were executed in 2006 pursuant to death sentences. DEATH
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While this example relies on cinematic techniques for dramatic effect,
its subject is far from fictional. Inmates unwittingly take part in such smoke-
filled scenes in prisons2 throughout the country, where secondhand smoke3
("SHS") may permeate every remote comer. Many prisons facilitate the per-
vasiveness of SHS by selling tobacco at prison commissaries and by failing
to implement and adequately enforce smoking bans. Because a majority of
states have instituted complete inmate smoking bans, SHS in prisons is less
pervasive than it once was. Nevertheless, the risk remains very real in the
twenty-one states that still permit inmate smoking on prison grounds.4
The Eighth Amendment ostensibly affords prisoners some protection
against SHS. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Eighth Amendment's
proscription against the infliction of "cruel and unusual punishment"5
broadly, such that it applies not only to an inmate's sentence but also to the
conditions of his or her confinement.6 In 1993, the Court held in Helling v.
McKinney that the Eighth Amendment protects inmates against the deliber-
ate indifference of prison officials to a serious risk of harm posed by SHS.7
Under Helling, inmates alleging SHS exposure must prove that the risk they
face is "not one that today's society chooses to tolerate"" and that prison
officials exhibit deliberate indifference by consciously disregarding that
risk.9
Notwithstanding the Court's decision in Helling, the Eighth Amendment
has provided little actual recourse for inmates' SHS-related claims in lower
courts. The Supreme Court has held that courts must use objective indicia to
make factual determinations with respect to Eighth Amendment claims in
order to avoid the appearance that the court's subjective viewpoint dictates
PENALTY INFO. CTR., THE DEATH PENALTY IN 2006: YEAR END REPORT (2006), available at http://
www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/2006YearEnd.pdf.
2. This Note uses "prison" to refer generally to any facility that houses prisoners, whether it
is specifically classified as a prison, jail, or other correctional facility.
3. While many sources use the term environmental tobacco smoke ("ETS"), this Note
adopts the approach of the recent Surgeon General report on smoking by consistently using the term
secondhand smoke ("SHS"), see 2006 SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 9 (concluding
that the term "secondhand smoke" captures the involuntary nature of nonsmokers' exposure to to-
bacco smoke better than does "environmental tobacco smoke"), except when quoting from a source
using a different term.
4. See infra notes 71-72 and accompanying text (reporting that fifteen states allow smoking
on prison grounds, banning only smoking indoors, and six states have not yet banned inmate smok-
ing even indoors).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
6. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976).
7. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993) (affirming the Ninth Circuit's holding that
a prisoner states a cause of action under the Eighth Amendment by alleging that prison officials
have, with deliberate indifference, exposed him to levels of SHS that pose an unreasonable risk of
serious damage to his future health).
8. Id. at 36.
9. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994) (defining deliberate indifference as con-
scious disregard of a risk); Helling, 509 U.S. at 35-36.
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the results.' ° Despite the requirement of objective analysis, inmates encoun-
tering a risk from SHS in states allowing inmate smoking have rarely been
able to obtain relief." Instead, their claims are often summarily dismissed in
opinions presenting little analysis of factual findings necessitated by the
Helling standard. 
2
This Note argues that courts should acknowledge current societal and
medical perspectives on SHS and afford real protection to prisoners against
SHS through injunctive relief. Part I examines evidence that conclusively
demonstrates the serious risk of harm posed by SHS to the health of in-
mates. It reports that inmates' long-term exposure to SHS increases their
risk of contracting lung cancer, heart disease, and other potentially life-
threatening conditions. Part II argues that, as required by the Helling stan-
dard, contemporary society does not tolerate involuntary, long-term
exposure to SHS and that prison officials exhibit deliberate indifference by
10. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
11. See infra note 12. One notable exception, where an inmate recovered on an SHS claim, is
Tudor v. Moore, No. 2:98-1927, slip op. at 23 (D.S.C. Oct. 5, 2005), aff'd sub nom. Tudor v. Harri-
son, 195 F. App'x 160 (4th Cir. 2006), where the plaintiff was awarded $3,200 in damages. See
Tudor, No. 2:98-1927, slip op. at 23 (concluding that the plaintiff had "some pain, discomfort, and
exacerbation of his asthmatic condition due to SHS requiring increased use of his inhaler"). Another
is Reilly v. Grayson, 157 F Supp. 2d 762, 773-74 (E.D. Mich. 2001), aff'd, 310 F.3d 519 (6th Cir.
2002), where the plaintiff was awarded $54,750 in damages. See Reilly, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 773-74
(awarding compensatory and punitive damages based on the denial of a smoke-free cell to an asth-
matic inmate for five years). Denials of summary judgment are scarce in SHS cases; however, some
courts have found genuine issues of material fact. E.g., Denis v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Servs.,
No. 05 Civ. 4495(LAK), 2006 WL 406313, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2006) (order denying summary
judgment), enforcing 2006 WL 217926, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2006) (Mag. Rep. & Recommen-
dation) (finding genuine issues of material fact with respect to whether defendant's policy was
adequate as written and as enforced). Occasionally, appellate courts have overturned dismissals of
SHS claims. The Sixth Circuit, for example, held that "the mere existence of non-smoking pods"
does not insulate a prison from liability where deliberate indifference to a prisoner's future health is
alleged. Talal v. White, 403 F.3d 423, 428 (6th Cir. 2004) (vacating a dismissal order and remand-
ing). Such cases, however, remain exceptional.
12. For example, in Holman v. Gillen, No. 00 C 0833, 2002 WL 31834875 (N.D. I11. Dec.
17, 2002), the court was "unpersuaded that the mere possibility of increased risk of cancer or other
smoke-related disease" constituted a substantial risk of harm in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Id. at *3-4 (granting defendant's motion for summary judgment based on conclusion that the "pos-
sible health problems" associated with SHS are "risks that society chooses to tolerate"). In
Henderson v. Martin, 73 F. App'x 115 (6th Cir. 2003), the Sixth Circuit concluded that the plaintiff's
claim lacked medical documentation of a "sufficiently serious" risk and further that officials at the
Michigan prison where the plaintiff was housed were not deliberately indifferent because they had
adopted an indoor nonsmoking policy. Id. at 118 (affirming summary judgment). In another case,
the Seventh Circuit granted summary judgment on the basis that prison officials could not have been
deliberately indifferent because they "general[ly] enforce[d]" a policy of separating smokers from
nonsmokers. Harrison v. Helman, No. 97-3287, 1998 WL 133426, at *1 (7th Cir. Mar. 12, 1998).
The Eleventh Circuit, in its first SHS case, held that the inmate failed to proffer adequate evidence
to show that the prison ventilation was not sufficient and lacked objective evidence of unreasonably
high levels of SHS. Kelley v. Hicks, 400 E3d 1282, 1285 (lth Cir. 2005) (affirming summary
judgment to defendants). The Fifth Circuit affirmed a dismissal of an SHS claim where the plaintiff
had been exposed to some level of smoke. Callicutt v. Anderson, 48 E App'x 916, 916 (5th Cir.
2002) (affirming dismissal after a bench trial on the basis that plaintiff had failed to prove the prison
officials were deliberately indifferent). The court reported that the defendants' expert testified that
the plaintiff's medical condition did not reflect that he had suffered any harm and the record showed
that the single guard assigned to the plaintiff's unit could not always prevent prisoners from violat-
ing a smoking policy. Id.
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allowing inmates to possess tobacco without effectively addressing the risk
of harm that policy creates for other inmates. Additionally, Part II rejects the
proposition that a court confronted with an Eighth Amendment violation
may fail to act merely because legislative action may eventually cure the
constitutional deficiency. Finally, Part III contends that a court is empow-
ered to remedy this Eighth Amendment violation effectively by easing an
inmate's burden of production and by ordering prison officials to adopt in-
creasingly strict smoking restrictions until the inmate no longer faces a
serious risk of harm.
1. THE SERIOUS RISK POSED BY SECONDHAND SMOKE
In 1993, when Helling was decided, the scientific community suspected
that SHS was causally linked to a number of diseases, but research into the
linkage was still in its infancy. Today, however, it is clear that the carcino-
gens in SHS present a serious risk of harm to smokers and nonsmokers
alike. This Part reviews the medical evidence on SHS, documenting that
SHS poses an especially serious risk of harm to the health of exposed in-
mates.
Significant evidence demonstrates that SHS, which contains as many as
250 known toxic substances or carcinogens,13 leads to disease. A 2005 study
estimated that SHS annually kills more than 49,000 adult nonsmokers in the
United States due to lung cancer and coronary heart disease.'4 DNA-
damaging material found in SHS leads to genetic mutations that cause lung
cancer.'5 Coronary heart disease results from the interference of SHS with
the cardiovascular system's "normal functioning."'' 6 SHS so rapidly impacts
the cardiovascular system that exposure lasting even thirty minutes will have
a measurable impact on indicators associated with increased risk of disease 7
13. 2006 SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 29.
14. Id. at i (reporting U.S. estimates of 3000 annual deaths relating to lung cancer and
46,000 deaths relating to coronary heart disease).
15. Id. at 45; see also Kirsti Husgafvel-Pursiainen et al., p5
3 
Mutations and Exposure to
Environmental Tobacco Smoke in a Multicenter Study on Lung Cancer, 60 CANCER RES. 2906,
2906, 2910 (2000) (concluding that "mechanisms of lung carcinogenesis" observed in individuals
who had been exposed to SHS but who had never smoked themselves include mutations in the tu-
mor suppression gene p53, similar to those occurring in smokers). Similar mechanisms cause lung
cancer as a result of exposure in active smokers and those affected by SHS. 2006 SURGEON GEN-
ERAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 667.
16. 2006 SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 64. Exposure to SHS also amplifies
the risk of coronary heart disease for a number of other reasons: increased clot formation, a negative
impact on cholesterol levels (increased low-density lipo-protein and decreased high-density lipo-
protein levels), increased likelihood of developing atherosclerosis, increased severity of myocardial
infarction, reduced heart rate variability, and increased demand for oxygen simultaneous with a
reduced oxygen-delivering capacity. Id. at 53, 57-59, 63.
17. See Joaquin Barnoya & Stanton A. Glantz, Cardiovascular Effects of Secondhand
Smoke: Nearly as Large as Smoking, III CIRCULATION 2684, 2687 (2005), available at http://
circ.ahajournals.org/cgi/content/fullll 11/20/2684 (explaining that SHS begins to impair the heart's
ability to convert oxygen into an energy molecule after only a single thirty minute exposure); see
also 2006 SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 64 (indicating that some immediate effects
on the cardiovascular System of even short exposure to SHS appear as large as those resulting from
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and will affect the cardiovascular system eighty to ninety percent as much,
on average, as active smoking." SHS stimulates myriad other adverse ef-
fects, especially diseases affecting the respiratory system, such as asthma,
lung impairment, and possibly chronic obstructive pulmonary disease.' 9
The risk of harm posed by SHS to the health of an exposed inmate' ° ex-
ceeds the risk confronting the average nonsmoker. Inmates are usually
confined to specific areas of the prison facility and have little opportunity to
escape contaminated air.2' They spend the majority of their time in com-
monly affected spaces, including living areas, dining halls, recreational
spaces, and prison libraries.2 Moreover, overcrowding may cause prison
officials to convert areas with insufficient ventilation for use as additional
housing, leading to significantly increased SHS concentrations.2
3
Attempts to reduce the harm posed by SHS, including separating smok-
ers and nonsmokers, regularly cleaning the prison air, and replacing indoor
air with outdoor air, have proven ineffective. 24 Since SHS consists of a"complex mixture of [solid] and gaseous components," the characteristics of
active smoking of a pack of cigarettes daily). Exposure to SHS for just two hours can reduce heart
rate variability by twelve percent, a result associated with increased risk of ventricular fibrillation
and heart disease. See Bamoya & Glantz, supra, at 2693-94.
18. Bamoya & Glantz, supra note 17, at 2694.
19. 2006 SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 46 (reporting that the respiratory
system is especially at risk, because it is the "portal of entry" for SHS). Maternal exposure to smoke
during pregnancy is a major risk factor for sudden infant death syndrome and neurobehavioral de-
velopment problems in infants. Id. at 50. Moreover, a recent California state report concluded that
SHS is causally associated with breast cancer in younger, primarily premenopausal, women. AIR
RES. BD., CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PROPOSED IDENTIFICATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL TOBACCO
SMOKE AS A Toxic AIR CONTAMINANT app. IH, at 7-82 (2005), available at ftp://ftp.arb.ca.gov/
carbis/regact/ets2006/ app3part%20b.pdf.
20. Cf 2006 SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 628 (reporting that, where smok-
ing is allowed inside prisons, nonsmokers will likely face exposure to significant concentrations of
SHS). An estimated 450,000 to 850,000 nonsmokers reside in U.S. prisons and jails, as compared to
an estimated 1.3 to 1.7 million smoker inmates. See id. (indicating that between sixty and eighty
percent of U.S. prisoners smoke); HARRISON & BECK, supra note 1, at 2 tbl.l (reporting that 2.1
million inmates resided in state and federal correctional facilities as of June 30, 2005).
21. Lisa Gizzi, Note, Helling v. McKinney and Smoking in the Cell Block: Cruel and Un-
usual Punishment?, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 1091, 1129 (1994) (observing that prisoners do not have the
freedom to avoid SHS that is usually available to those outside prison walls).
22. Research conducted in two Vermont correctional facilities and a Massachusetts correc-
tional facility found average nicotine concentrations ranging from 0.4 Vg/m' at a vocation center to
24.6 pg/m' at a prison gym. S. Katharine Hammond & Karen M. Emmons, Inmate exposure to sec-
ondhand smoke in correctional facilities and the impact of smoking restrictions, 15 J. EXPOSURE
ANALYSIS & ENVTL. EPIDEMIOLOGY 205, 208 tbl. 1 (2005). Other areas tested were a common room
(7.6 pg/m') and three dorm rooms (3.9, 7.3, and 9.7 pg/m' respectively). Id. These findings compare
to average nicotine concentrations of 2 pg/m' in a random selection of homes of smokers. Id. at 208.
The atmospheric concentration of nicotine is a valid quantitative indicator of SHS indoors. 2006
SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 99.
23. Hammond & Emmons, supra note 22, at 210 (explaining that overcrowding can result in
prison officials converting areas with insufficient ventilation for housing, such that SHS will "reach
extremely high concentrations," and reporting that the study recorded levels in a converted former
gymnasium five times greater than those found in a regular housing area).
24. 2006 SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 1, at i; see also id. at 92 (concluding that
ventilation systems cannot adequately control exposure to SHS unless a complete smoking ban is
enforced).
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SHS evolve over time.21 Smoke emitted from the burning end of a cigarette
26releases "volatile compounds," which tend to hang in the air. The air filters
used in most heating, ventilating, and air conditioning ("HVAC") systems
are inadequate to fully cleanse the air because they typically fail to remove
the small particles and gases comprising SHS. 7 Replacing indoor air with
outdoor air is similarly ineffective since such mixing does not completely
28change the air and does not impact air quality evenly throughout a room.
Moreover, HVAC systems may minimize or shut off the influx of outside air
in favor of contaminated indoor air when outside air is too warm, too humid,
or too cold to be used to maintain an acceptable temperature. 29 Finally,
prison HVAC systems generally circulate air throughout the facility, poten-
tially redistributing contaminated air.30
In light of the inadequacy of ventilation-centered attempts to reduce ex-
posure, and in the absence of effective smoking bans, significant
concentrations of SHS confront inmates. Although the need for empirical
research into SHS levels in prison has remained largely unfulfilled, a rare
study conducted in Vermont prisons documented extreme nicotine concen-
trations when those prisons did not restrict smoking.3' Researchers measured
levels over three nonconsecutive weeks: before any smoking ban, while a
complete smoking ban was in effect, and after outdoor smoking privileges
were reinstated.32 The study reveals that, in the absence of any smoking ban,
prison air may contain nicotine concentrations up to twelve times higher
than concentrations found in smokers' homes.33 Since there is a linear rela-
25. Id. at 85.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 86.
28. Id. at 88 (observing that no more than 63.2% of the original air in even a well-mixed
space is likely to change in an hour).
29. Id. at 89-90.
30. Id. at 86,91.
31. See Hammond & Emmons, supra note 22, at 209-10.
32. Id. at 206-07. Using nicotine samplers to test the air, the researchers took baseline nico-
tine samples in mid-June 1992, when smoking was freely allowed. The study included additional
tests four months later in October, after Vermont instituted a complete smoking ban, as well as five
months later in March 1993, after the Vermont prisons relaxed their ban to allow smoking outdoors.
The Vermont sampling took place at two prisons, one housing inmates for relatively short stays and
the other for much longer stays. The study relied on measurements taken over seven days by ap-
proximately forty nicotine samplers placed throughout each facility in locations inaccessible to the
inmates. Id. In 2004, Vermont reinstituted a total smoking ban. AGENCY OF HUMAN SERVS., VT.
DEP'T OF CORR., DIRECTIVE No. 408.02, TOBACCO PRODUCTS (2004), http://www.doc.state.vt.us/
about/policies/numeric/corrservices (follow "Tobacco Products" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 30,
2007).
33. See Hammond & Emmons, supra note 22, at 208. The study found a mean nicotine
concentration of 24.6 pg/m3 in a gym doubling as living quarters, whereas a previous study reported
an average nicotine concentration of 2 pg/m3 in smokers' residences. Id.
2086 [Vol. 105:2081
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tionship between exposure to SHS and the associated risk of developing
lung cancer,3 4 permitting smoking poses a significant risk to inmates.
Data from the Vermont study suggest that a complete ban, which prohib-
its possession of tobacco by inmates, is most likely to minimize exposure to
SHS, but only when that ban is regularly enforced and prison officials put in
place effective measures to combat tobacco smuggling.35 Both the complete
ban and the indoor ban significantly reduced-but did not eliminate-the
presence of nicotine.36 The researchers indicated that the modified smoking
restrictions might have been more effective if the consequences for violating
the smoking policy were greater."
II. SECONDHAND SMOKE AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
This Part argues that, under the Helling standard, prison officials violate
the Eighth Amendment by failing to ban inmate smoking in order to prevent
long-term exposure of inmates to significant levels of SHS. Section II.A
explains the Helling standard. Section II.B argues that wide-reaching smok-
ing bans demonstrate societal intolerance toward the serious risk of harm
posed by involuntary, long-term exposure to significant levels of SHS. Sec-
tion II.C contends that prison officials likely exhibit deliberate indifference
by failing to completely ban the possession of tobacco by inmates despite
recognizing that inmates' likely noncompliance with any lesser ban will sub-
ject nonsmoker inmates to a serious risk of harm.
A. The Helling v. McKinney Standard
The Supreme Court held in Helling v. McKinney that the Eighth Amend-
ment prohibits the deliberate indifference of prison officials to a serious risk
of harm posed by SHS to inmates.38 The Eighth Amendment protects con-
victed prisoners against the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment.3 9 This
protection applies to certain deprivations suffered during imprisonment, even
34. See J.L. Repace & A.H. Lowrey, A Quantitative Estimate of Nonsmokers'Lung Cancer
Risk from Passive Smoking, I 1 ENV'T INT'L 3, 9 (1985) (concluding, based on studies across three
cultures, that an assumption of a linear exposure-response relationship is justified).
35. See Hammond & Emmons, supra note 22, at 209. While SHS concentrations observed
during Vermont's complete ban were higher than concentrations observed during the indoor ban in a
few areas of the prison, this seemingly counterintuitive result may merely indicate that the relatively
new complete ban was not yet being fully enforced.
36. See id. at 208 tbl.1, 210 (reporting postban nicotine concentrations ranging from 1.5 to
1.7 Pg/m 3 in areas where smoking had previously been allowed, a concentration of 0.6 pg/mr' in what
had previously been the sole nonsmoking dorm, and concentrations ranging from 2.3 to 6.5 pg/m
3 
in
central facilities excluding the booking area, the facility entrance, and the visiting rooms).
37. See id. at 210.
38. 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993).
39. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 296-97 (1991). Since the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Eighth Amendment has applied against state as well as
federal actors. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005).
2087June 2007]
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when the inmate's sentence does not specifically provide for the deprivation.40
The Supreme Court has explained the rationale by noting that:
[W]hen the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an in-
dividual's liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself, and at the
same time fails to provide for his basic human needs-e.g., food, clothing,
shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety-it transgresses the substan-
tive limits on state action set by the Eighth Amendment.'
These substantive limits change with the "evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society,'42 incorporating contemporary
notions of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.43
While the Court has recognized that the Constitution does not require
"comfortable prisons,"" it has held that the Eighth Amendment guarantees a
"minimal civilized measure of life's necessities., 45 The Court has specified
that these necessities include food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and rea-
sonable safety,46 the denial of which may "result in pain and suffering which
no one suggests would serve any penological purpose. 47
Since 1976, it has been clear that the Eighth Amendment protects
against deliberate indifference to a prisoner's "serious medical needs. '4'
Successful Eighth Amendment claims contain both objective and subjective
elements.49 The objective element requires the harm to be serious.50 The sub-
jective element, deliberate indifference, exists only where a defendant
consciously disregards a risk.5'
In Helling, the Supreme Court held that an inmate stated a viable Eighth
Amendment cause of action by alleging that prison officials, with deliberate
indifference, subjected him to an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his
future health by allowing his continued exposure to SHS.52 McKinney, a
Nevada state prisoner, claimed that almost constant exposure to SHS from
his cellmate's and others' cigarettes presented an unreasonable risk of harm
40. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976).
41. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989).
42. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101
(1958) (plurality opinion)) (holding that double ceiling of inmates did not constitute cruel and un-
usual punishment).
43. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 11 (1992) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102).
44. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 349.
45. Id. at 347.
46. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993) (citing DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199-200).
47. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103.
48. Id. at 104.
49. Helling, 509 U.S. at 35.
50. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104.
51. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994).
52. Helling, 509 U.S. at 35.
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to his health. 3 Nevada prison officials, according to McKinney, repeatedly
denied his requests to transfer him to a single cell or to house him with a
nonsmoker. 4 The Court rejected the prison officials' argument that only de-
liberate indifference to current serious health problems of inmates should be
actionable.55 It instead sanctioned "future harm" actions under the Eighth
Amendment, indicating that it would be odd to deny relief to an inmate who
has proven an unsafe, life-threatening condition on the ground that nothing
has happened to him yet.5 6 The Court also rejected arguments from the
United States as amicus curiae that the harm to any particular individual
from exposure to SHS was speculative and that the risk was not sufficiently
grave, as a matter of law, to implicate a serious medical need.57 The Court
indicated that McKinney would have to prove on remand that "it is contrary
to current standards of decency for anyone to be so exposed against his will
and that prison officials are deliberately indifferent to his plight.58 However,
pursuant to a settlement agreement, the district court dismissed the case with
prejudice before undertaking any inquiry upon remand.59
B. Societal Intolerance Toward Significant Exposure
With respect to the objective element of an Eighth Amendment future
harm claim, a court must assess "whether society considers the risk that the
prisoner complains of to be so grave that it violates contemporary standards
of decency to expose anyone unwillingly to such a risk" 60 Stated differently,
a prisoner must show that the risk of which he complains is "not one that
today's society chooses to tolerate.
' 6'
53. Id.
54. McKinney v. Anderson (McKinney 1), 924 E2d 1500, 1502 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated on
other grounds sub nom. Helling v. McKinney, 502 U.S. 903 (1991).
55. Helling, 509 U.S. at 34.
56. See id. at 33-34.
57. Id. at 34-35.
58. Id. at 35; see generally Elizabeth Alexander & David C. Fathi, Smoking, the Perception
of Risk and the Eighth Amendment, 13 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 691, 702 (1994) (criticizing the
Helling standard for the implication that prisoners may be exposed to bad conditions merely because
such conditions routinely exist among nonprisoners).
59. McKinney v. Anderson (McKinney I1), No. CV-N-87-36-ECR (PHA), slip op. at 1 (D.
Nev. Jan. 11, 1995). The settlement provided that, unless unusual circumstances existed, McKinney
would be housed either in a single cell or in a double cell with a nonsmoking roommate. Id. at 3.
60. Helling, 509 U.S. at 36.
61. Id. Many courts require proof of "societal intolerance" for all Eighth Amendment claims
involving SHS, even those alleging a deprivation of a serious medical need for a smoke-free environ-
ment. See, e.g., Talal v. White, 403 F.3d 423, 426 (6th Cir. 2005) (requiring, even in light of the
inmate's documented allergy to SHS, that he demonstrate a risk "so grave that it violates contemporary
standards of decency to expose anyone unwillingly" to it (quoting Helling, 509 U.S. at 36)). This ar-
guably misapplies the Helling standard, since the issue before the Helling Court was whether alleging
an unreasonable risk to McKinney's future health stated a claim. See Helling, 509 U.S. at 31. Where an
inmate alleges pain arising from a preexisting serious medical need, such as allergies or a respiratory
condition, the Eighth Amendment claim does not sound in a risk of future harm. Instead, it is grounded
in present suffering, where the relevant objective test is whether the deprivation is sufficiently serious
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Although the Supreme Court has not offered lower courts further guid-
ance on how to apply the Helling standard, the Court's capital punishment
jurisprudence reveals how it has used objective factors to determine current
standards of decency.62 In Roper v. Simmons, the Court held unconstitutional
the execution of offenders who had committed their crimes as juveniles.63
Beginning its review with "objective indicia," the Roper Court found a so-
cietal consensus in the acts of many state legislatures abolishing the death
penalty for juveniles64 The Court has also found significant the number of
states that have acted on a particular matter as well as "the consistency of
the direction of change."65
Applying similar objective criteria, existing prison smoking bans dem-
onstrate that society does not tolerate the significant exposure that inmates
face. The Federal Bureau of Prisons bans inmate smoking indoors except in
connection with authorized religious activity and allows its wardens the dis-
cretion to prohibit inmate smoking outdoors as well.66 While a 1993 survey
67found that no prison system had entirely banned smoking, all but a few
states had adopted smoking policies for their prisons by the end of 2006,
ranging from minimal restrictions to complete bans. 68 As of the end of 2006,
twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia completely banned inmate
69smoking on prison property. Supplementing statewide restrictions, many
to violate societal standards of decency, see Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992), not whether
a risk is unreasonable. Applying language from Helling about how society views a risk despite an
allegation of "present harm" confuses the Helling standard and improperly shifts attention from the
appropriate inquiry into the seriousness of the present harm and suffering.
62. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (identifying factors relevant to the
Court's determination that the Eighth Amendment forbids imposing the death penalty for rape,
including public attitudes concerning a particular sentence history and precedent, legislative atti-
tudes, and the response of juries reflected in their sentencing decisions).
63. 543 U.S. 551, 578-79 (2005).
64. See id. at 564, 578. In a prior case, a plurality of the Court also considered the views of
respected professional organizations, such as the American Bar Association and the American Law
Institute, as relevant to standards of decency. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 (1988).
65. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 566 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315 (2002)).
66. See FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROGRAM STATEMENT No.
P1640.04, SMOKING/No SMOKING AREAS 5 (2004), available at http://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/
1640_004.pdf.
67. 2006 SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 628.
68. States have adopted many of the bans as a result of state clean indoor air acts, either by
force of the statutes themselves, see, e.g., N.Y. Pua. HEALTH LAW § 1399-o (McKinney 2006);
Clean Indoor Air Act of 1990, S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-95-20 (2005), or by regulations or policies
promulgated as a result of the statutes, see 2006 SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 628
(noting that a 2003 survey concluded that two-thirds of responding correctional facilities which had
adopted smoke-free policies reported that federal case law, state law, or local ordinances had man-
dated the implementation of the policies). Penal codes in some states specifically prohibit smoking
by inmates and other individuals on prison grounds. See e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 5030.1 (West
Supp. 2007).
69. The "complete ban" states are Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. The District of
Columbia has also completely banned inmate smoking in its prisons. For examples of policies im-
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county corrections officials and individual prison wardens completely ban
inmate smoking within individual correctional facilities. 70 Despite a trend
toward complete smoking bans, twenty-one states have not yet adopted
complete bans. Fifteen of these states prohibit smoking only indoors.7, Al-
though the approaches of the remaining six states vary, common practices
include housing nonsmokers with other nonsmokers upon request, permit-
ting smoking indoors except in designated smoke-free zones, and delegating
authority to wardens to develop institution-specific policies rather than im-
72plementing a statewide solution to prison smoking.
Outside the prison context, widespread smoking bans at federal, state,
and local levels, and the actions of respected professional organizations,
offer additional objective indicia of a societal consensus of intolerance to-
ward long-term exposure to Ss. 73 The federal government has banned
smoking in most federal buildings 74 and aboard airplanes. 75 The United
plementing total bans, see ALASKA DEP'T OF CORR., INDEX No. 101.08, SMOKING (2002); COLO.
DEP'T OF CORR., REG. No. 100-04, TOBACCO USE IN BUILDINGS AND VEHICLES (2006); NEV. DEP'T
OF CORR., ADMIN. REG. No. 115, DEPARTMENTAL SMOKING POLICY (2006). Remaining policies and
state responses to the author's inquiries as of December 31, 2006, are on file with the author. While
the total bans do not all operate similarly, they all prohibit the use and possession of tobacco by
inmates on prison grounds.
70. See Raymond Hemandez, More Prisons Are Banning Cigarettes: "Smoke Free" Tensions
Feared in Westchester, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1995, at 37 (describing bans imposed on a county-wide
basis or by individual prisons); Bruce Tomaso, Inmates adapting to smoking ban: Three years later,
it's hardly a hot issue, officials say, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 8, 1998, at 43A (explaining that
many local Texas jails ban smoking).
71. The "indoor ban" states are Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Ken-
tucky, Michigan, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, and West
Virginia. For examples of policies implementing indoor bans, see ALA. DEP'T OF CORR., ADMIN.
REG. No. 009, SMOKE/TOBACCO FREE POLICY (2004); OHIO DEP'T OF REHABILITATION & CORR.,
No. 10-SAF-01, SMOKE-FREE WORKPLACE (2006). Remaining smoking policies and state responses
to the author's inquiries as of December 31, 2006, are on file with the author.
72. The remaining states are Illinois, Louisiana, Mississippi, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
and Virginia. For examples of policies implementing restrictions less comprehensive than a full
indoor ban, see PA. DEP'T OF CORR., POL'Y No. 1.1.7, SMOKING IN THE DEPARTMENT OF CORREC-
TIONS (2000) (prohibiting smoking in most common areas but exempting designated inmate break
areas); S.C. DEP'T OF CORR., No. ADM-16.06, SMOKING ON SCDC PROPERTY (2002) (permitting
smoking in inmate housing areas that have not been designated as nonsmoking by the warden).
Remaining smoking policies and state responses to the author's inquiries as of December 31, 2006,
are on file with the author.
73. See McKinney I, supra note 54, 924 F.2d 1500, 1508 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated on other
grounds sub nom. Helling v. McKinney, 502 U.S. 903 (1991) (citing as indicia state statutes restrict-
ing smoking in public places, federal regulations controlling smoking, smoking restrictions in
correctional facilities at all levels, and local smoking laws); cf Lauren I. Ginestra, Comment, Envi-
ronmental Tobacco Smoke: Cruel and Unusual Punishment?, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 169, 192 (1993)
(arguing that society's response to scientific evidence on SHS supports a conclusion that some levels
of SHS exposure constitute cruel and unusual punishment).
74. The federal govemment adopted a policy in 1997 mandating smoke-free environments
for most federal employees and visitors to federal facilities. Exec. Order No. 13,058, 62 Fed. Reg.
43,451 (Aug. 13, 1997), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (2006).
75. See 49 U.S.C. § 41706 (2006) (implementing air transportation smoking ban); see also
14 C.F.R. §§ 252.3-.5 (2006). Floor debates accompanying 1987 amendments to the airline non-
smoking rules indicate that Congress gave significant consideration to the health risks of SHS. See
133 CONG. REC. 29819-20 (1987) (statement of Sen. Simpson) (commenting that the "swirls of
smoke" in an airplane do not differentiate between smoking and nonsmoking sections); id. at
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States military has also significantly restricted indoor smoking with the ex-
ception of certain private lodging facilities.76 All states have recognized the
risk posed by long-term exposure to SHS by imposing some restrictions on
smoking indoors. 7 Many states have enacted comprehensive solutions78 and
hundreds of municipalities have adopted comprehensive local indoor clean
air acts.79 Professional organizations, such as the American Correctional As-
sociation0 and the American Jailers Association,"1 recommend that prisons
adopt nonsmoking policies.
Courts should consider the existence of a societal consensus in light of
the seriousness of the risk posed by the plaintiff's exposure. Where an in-
mate plaintiff documents consistent, long-term exposure to significant levels
of SHS, it is irrelevant under Helling that society may still tolerate exposure
to lesser risks. Those who object to using the Eighth Amendment to protect
inmates from SHS are correct that smoking remains common in the United
12States, but their criticism fails for two chief reasons. First, the relevant
question under Helling is not whether society tolerates any risk of harm
from SHS but rather if society tolerates high risk of the sort SHS poses to
prisoners. Second, because nonsmokers' exposure in prison is involuntary, it
29821-23 (statement of Sen. Hatch) (arguing that society should not ban individuals from airplanes
simply because they cannot safely breathe air polluted by other passengers).
76. 2006 SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 586. In 1994, the Department of
Defense ordered that all workplace settings under its control be made smoke-free. Id. Most military
living facilities are also now smoke-free. Id.
77. Forty-nine states and the District of Columbia had restricted indoor smoking in some
manner as of December 31, 2005. Id. at 582. According to the Centers for Disease Control database,
which the Surgeon General Report cites, Kentucky was the lone holdout. See Centers for Disease
Control, State Tobacco Activities Tracking and Evaluation (STATE) System, http://www.cdc.govl
tobacco/statesystem (follow "Detailed Report" hyperlink; then select "Topic: Legislation-Smokefree
Indoor Air," "Measure: Smokefree Indoor Air--Other Sites," and "Year: 2005-4th Quarter" to view
information for each state) (last visited Mar. 30, 2007) (reporting that all states but Kentucky had
restricted indoor smoking in some fashion as of Dec. 31, 2005). However, since Kentucky now
prohibits indoor smoking by inmates, see supra note 71, all states now acknowledge the risk of
harm posed by SHS.
78. Although none of these bans yet completely prohibits smoking indoors, in the past five
years, eleven states and the District of Columbia have enacted "comprehensive smoke-free laws
throughout their jurisdictions that, when the laws take full effect as implemented in practice, will
require almost all enclosed workplaces and public places, including restaurants and bars, to be
smoke-free." 2006 SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 582 (citing figures accurate as of
April 2006). For example, the California legislature enacted a workplace smoking ban, indicating its
intent to "prohibit the smoking of tobacco products in all (100 percent of) enclosed places of em-
ployment in this state, as covered by this section." CAL. LAB. CODE § 6404.5(a) (West 2003). The
ban took effect on January 1, 2007. Id.
79. 2006 SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 583 (describing the popularity of
municipal restrictions on indoor smoking).
80. Am. Corr. Ass'n, Public Correctional Policy on Nonsmoking Policies (Aug. 11, 1999),
http://www.aca.org/government/policyresolution/view.asp?ID=28&print (last visited Mar. 30, 2007).
81. McKinney I, supra note 54, 924 F.2d 1500, 1509 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated on other
grounds sub nom. Helling v. McKinney, 502 U.S. 903 (1991) (citing the American Jailers Associa-
tion resolution advocating for prison nonsmoking policies).
82. See Reply Brief of Petitioners at 28-29, Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993) (No.
91-1958), 1992 WL 512101.
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is irrelevant that a minority of Americans voluntarily assume a greater risk
than society generally tolerates.s3
Although many states have adopted prison bans,8 courts must still pro-
tect the Eighth Amendment rights of prisoners in those states that have not
yet acted. Legislatures and prison officials in the remaining states have
failed to adopt or have even explicitly rejected complete bans, continuing to
allow smoking on prison grounds or indoors. For example, legislative efforts
to introduce any ban in Illinois, where smoking is freely permitted indoors
at all but one prison, have failed repeatedly. 5 Michigan prison officials had
originally planned to completely ban smoking by 1998, but instead they
86continue to allow smoking outdoors. The Florida State Assembly consid-
ered legislation to implement a complete prison smoking ban in 1998 but
then amended it to allow smoking outside prison buildings8 7 Although it is
plausible that even these states will completely ban inmate smoking in the
future, courts must act to remedy existing violations of the Eighth Amend-
ment in cases brought before them.8
C. The Deliberate Indifference Inquiry
To prove a violation under Helling, an inmate must demonstrate not only
that society does not tolerate the risk that confronts the inmate, but that
83. See Helling, 509 U.S. at 35 (directing that the inquiry be whether "it is contrary to cur-
rent standards of decency for anyone to be so exposed against his wilt' (emphasis added)).
84. In implementing bans, a majority of states have demonstrated not only an interest in
addressing the serious risk of harm posed by SHS but also a concern with controlling staggering
prison health care costs. See, e.g., OFFICE OF SENATE FLOOR ANALYSES, ANALYSIS OF A.B. 384 (Cal.
2004) available at http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/03-04/billlasmab_0351-0400/ab_384_cfa_20040822_
093739_sen-floor.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2007) (concluding that prior to a recent smoking ban
the state spent approximately $266 million in additional health care costs for smoker inmates);
Karen Cropsey, Gloria D. Eldridge, & Tina Ladner, Smoking among female prisoners: An ignored
public health epidemic, 29 ADDICTIVE BEHAVS. 425, 426 (2004) (describing high rates of cardiovas-
cular disease, cancer, and other smoking-related problems in prisoners and noting that, despite their
relative youth as a population, one in six inmates reports a serious medical problem). A 1998 survey
reported that health care costs represented an average eleven percent of state corrections budgets.
DEBORAH LAMB-MECHANICK & JULIANNE NELSON, PRISON HEALTH CARE SURVEY: AN ANALYSIS
OF FACTORS INFLUENCING PER CAPITA COSTS 5 tbl. 1 (2000), available at http://www.nicic.org/pubs/
2000/015999.pdf. Health care costs continue to escalate rapidly. Id. at 1.
85. Kurt Erickson, Prison smoking ban back in talks, PANTAGRAPH-.COM, Sept. 21, 2006, http://
www.pantagraph.com/articles/2006/09/21/news/doc4512b994dd757976267792.txt (last visited Mar. 30,
2007). To date, Illinois prison officials have opposed any effort for a ban, although the governor's
office is making efforts to eliminate smoking in state buildings through collective bargaining, and it
is possible that a prison ban could result from that process. Id.
86. See Judy Putnam, Prisons to isolate indoor smokers: Tobacco-free zones will be set up to
protect non-smokers, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Aug. 2, 2004, at B6. The Michigan Department of
Corrections discontinued its plan after a trial ban at the Newberry prison reportedly resulted in "staff
assaults and a new black market for cigarettes." Id. As an alternative, Michigan wardens have desig-
nated voluntary tobacco-free zones within each prison facility with the hope that they would
"remove[] the tobacco element completely and promote[] a cleaner environment." Id.
87. House Bans Prison Smoking, VERO BEACH PRESS J., Apr. 16, 1998, at A16. Corrections
officials reported concerns that cigarettes would become contraband and that a smoking ban would
result in inmate disturbances. Id.
88. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 362 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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prison officials have acted with deliberate indifference by failing to ade-
quately address that risk. In conducting the deliberate indifference inquiry,
courts should examine the reasonableness of prison officials' adoption or
failure to adopt a smoking ban as well as the regularity of associated en-
forcement efforts. Applying this framework, prison officials who adopt a
policy less restrictive than a complete prohibition on inmate smoking are
likely acting unreasonably-and, thus, with deliberate indifference-to an
ongoing risk of harm.
Because the Eighth Amendment prohibits only cruel and unusual pun-
ishment,89 prison officials exhibit deliberate indifference only when they
consciously disregard a risk.9° Negligence alone is not enough to impose
Eighth Amendment liability.9' The Court has noted that an official does not
inflict punishment by "fail[ing] to alleviate a significant risk that he should
have perceived but did not."92 The deliberate indifference standard takes into
account prison officials' "unenviable task of keeping dangerous men in safe
custody under humane conditions."93 As a result, prison officials who recog-
nize a risk to inmate health or safety are not liable if they "responded
reasonably" to the risk, even if the harm was not averted.94
In determining the reasonableness of the response, courts should exam-
ine prison officials' adoption or failure to adopt a smoking ban as well as the
regularity of any associated enforcement efforts.95 In Helling, the Supreme
Court stated that the adoption of a smoking policy will "bear heavily" on the
inquiry into deliberate indifference for an SHS claim.96 The Supreme Court
also indicated that courts may appropriately consider the "realities of prison
89. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 300 (1991) (holding that where the pain inflicted is not
dispensed as punishment by a statute or sentencing judge, a mental element must be attributable to
the inflicting officer).
90. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 840 (1994); see generally Richard H. Kuhlman, Com-
ment, Prison Conditions and the Deliberate Indifference Standard Under the Eighth Amendment:
Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S.Ct. 2321 (1991), 42 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 369, 385 (1992) (argu-
ing that the deliberate indifference standard is vague and contributes to a lack of consistency in
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence).
91. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976) (holding that an inadvertent failure to
provide adequate medical care does not constitute "an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,"
nor is it "repugnant to the conscience of mankind").
92. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838 (emphasis added).
93. Id. at 844-45 (citing Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 193 (9th Cir. 1979)).
94. Fanner, 511 U.S. at 844.
95. See Cornish F Hitchcock, Environmental Tobacco Smoke as Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ment, 13 ST. Louis U. Pun. L. REv. 661, 686 (1994) ("Determinations on this score are inevitably
fact-bound, requiring an examination of... conditions ... present in a particular facility, the ade-
quacy of circulation, the existence of any policies restricting smoking.. . , the extent to which those
policies are, in fact, implemented, and other evidence relating to what prison officials knew and...
did ...."). Framed in this manner, the inquiry presumes that the defendants are responsible for
setting policy and assigning resources for a state department of corrections or a specific prison.
96. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36 (1993); cf Reilly v. Grayson, 157 F. Supp. 2d 762,
771 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (observing that implementing a nonsmoking policy may be the only reason-
able manner in which to address a "generalized risk of future harm" (citing McIntyre v. Robinson,
126 F. Supp. 2d 394, 402 (D. Md. 2000))), aff'd, 310 F.3d 519 (6th Cir. 2002).
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administration" when undertaking this inquiry.97 Interpreting this language,
one circuit has concluded that taking into account the realities of prison ad-
ministration does not simply allow prison administrators to escape scrutiny
without also showing that they have "afford[ed] sufficient weight to the con-
stitutional rights of individuals."9 '
When undertaking this inquiry, courts should acknowledge that SHS
poses a sufficiently large risk of harm that prison officials' knowledge of the
risk can be inferred.99 Society's efforts to reduce or eliminate exposure to
SHS, including banning smoking in prisons, have received great attention by
the media.0° Moreover, resolutions adopted by the major correctional asso-
ciations urging nonsmoking policies demonstrate that prison officials are
conscious of the risk of SHS to prisoners./°
Consistent with this inference, the failure to ban smoking indoors should
bear heavily on a determination that prison officials responded unreasonably
to the risk of harm posed by SHS. For example, adopting voluntary smoke-
free zones rather than imposing an indoor ban is unreasonable because the
Surgeon General has concluded that segregating smokers and nonsmokers,
even in separately ventilated areas, is insufficient to avoid the health risk
posed by SHS.'0 2
Moreover, prison officials likely exhibit deliberate indifference when
they fail to completely ban inmate smoking on prison grounds despite rec-
ognizing that the possession of tobacco by inmates perpetuates a serious risk
of harm for nonsmoker inmates. Officials may "not escape liability if the
evidence show[s] that [they] merely refused to verify underlying facts that
[they] strongly suspected to be true, or declined to confirm inferences of risk
that [they] strongly suspected to exist."''0 3 Studies have estimated that sixty
to eighty percent of inmates are smokers.'04 Nicotine's addictive properties"
97. Helling, 509 U.S. at 37.
98. Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1529 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc).
99. Cf Fruit v. Norris, 905 F.2d 1147, 1150 (8th Cir. 1990) (citing Cortes-Quinones v.
Jimenez-Nettleship, 842 F.2d 556, 558 (lst Cir. 1988)) (holding that some acts and omissions will
be so dangerous that knowledge of the risk can be inferred).
100. See, e.g., Hernandez, supra note 70 (describing local efforts to ban smoking in prisons);
Gregg Zoroya, Smoking bans spread to prisons, USA TODAY, July 22, 2004, at A3.
101. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text (describing American Correction Associa-
tion and American Jailers Association resolutions advocating nonsmoking policies).
102. 2006 SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 1, at i; see also Lynn M. Galbraith-
Wilson, The Call for State Legislation on Environmental Tobacco Smoke in State Prisons, 13 HAM-
LINE J. PUB. L. & PoL'Y 335, 344 (1992) (arguing that separating smokers from nonsmokers would
not alleviate the health threat posed by SHS).
103. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 843 n.8 (1994).
104. A 1993 study estimated that sixty-two percent of U.S. prisoners smoke. See Michael S.
Vaughn & Rolando V. del Carmen, Research Note: Smoking in Prisons-A National Survey of Cor-
rectional Administrators in the United States, 39 CRIME & DELINQ. 225, 232 (1993). No studies,
however, appear to capture the impact of recently imposed prison smoking bans, so timely empirical
evidence is needed.
105. In a study of Indiana prisoners conducted following a complete smoking ban, approxi-
mately eighty percent of smokers reported that it was "difficult or very difficult" for them to quit
June 2007] 2095
2096 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 105:2081
motivate many inmates to smoke when they are allowed to possess tobacco
in their cells, notwithstanding any indoor ban that may be in effect.' °6 As a
result, indoor bans that do not prevent inmates' access to tobacco have
proven ineffective,' °7 such that the majority of prisons have adopted com-
plete bans.08
Purported disciplinary concerns are insufficient to militate against a
finding of deliberate indifference. Although some prison officials have pre-
dicted that inmates will turn violent after a smoking ban is implemented,'
9
such concerns have proven largely unfounded."0 In light of evidence show-
ing that twenty-nine states have implemented complete bans, prison officials
cannot credibly testify to a good faith belief that implementing a complete
ban would pose a threat to prison order if handled properly."' Similarly, to-
bacco smuggling has proven manageable at facilities that have adopted
complete bans. Texas corrections officials found that smuggling was not
widespread, even three years after the state adopted a complete prison smok-
ing ban.' 2 Classifying tobacco smuggling in prisons as a felony, as Texas
smoking on previous attempts. Karen L. Cropsey & Jean L. Kristeller, Motivational factors related
to quitting smoking among prisoners during a smoking ban, 28 ADDICTIVE BEHAVS. 1081, 1085
(2003) (explaining that, at the time the ban was implemented, only about a third of inmate smokers
had contemplated quitting smoking within the next six months).
106. Putnam, supra note 86.
107. E.g., Reilly v. Grayson, 157 F Supp. 2d 762, 769 (E.D. Mich. 2001) ("Smoking inside
housing units was a persistent problem in [Department of Corrections] facilities; rules against [in-
door] smoking were more honored in the break [sic] than the observance."), aff'd, 310 F3d 519 (6th
Cir. 2002).
108. E.g., UTAH DEP'T OF CORR., INSTITUTIONAL OPERATIONS DIVISION MANUAL, CH.
FDR21, CONTRABAND (1996) (finding that banning possession of tobacco by inmates was necessary
to prevent tobacco smuggling and unauthorized smoking); see supra note 69 and accompanying text
(indicating that twenty-nine states have completely banned inmate smoking in prisons).
109. E.g., Mary Ellen Klas, House Derails Prison Smoking Ban Over Safety, PALM BEACH
POST, Mar. 12, 1997, at IA (quoting a Florida corrections sergeant's prediction that a smoking ban
would result in "officers going to the hospital in large numbers.").
110. See Zoroya, supra note 100. Colorado described minimal problems with its policy in
1999, explaining that three workers were fired for smuggling and several inmates (out of 14,000)
became sick on tobacco substitutes, one from attempting to smoke a nicotine patch. Prison Smoking
Ban: Despite Problems, Officials Pleased with Initial Results, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 16, 1999, at 7. A
spokesperson for Washington's corrections department described the first week its nonsmoking
policy was in effect: "[Slome of the inmates were a little bit testy, but nothing significant." Zoroya,
supra note 100. Similarly, Minnesota corrections official reported "business as usual" in state pris-
ons a few weeks after a system-wide smoking ban took effect. Steve Kamowski, Inmates Say
Smoking Ban a Real Drag: "I've Never Wanted a Cigarette So Bad in My Life," One Says, ST. PAUL
PIONEER PRESS, Aug. 22, 1997, at 2C.
111. Cf Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1529 (9th Cir. 1993) (concluding that a prison
administrator exhibits deliberate indifference by deciding to ignore grave suffering because of "ir-
relevant or unimportant concerns").
112. Tomaso, supra note 70. In 1998, three years after Texas prisons implemented a smoking
ban, a spokesperson indicated that twenty-three cases of employee smuggling had been referred to
the agency's internal affairs division. Id. At that time, it was a misdemeanor for a guard to sell to-
bacco to inmates, id., but the state later reclassified tobacco smuggling as a felony, see Prohibiting
the Introduction of Possession of Certain Items in Correctional Facilities or on Certain Property of
the Texas Department of Criminal Justice; Providing Penalties, 2003 Tex. Sess. Law. Serv. Ch. 470
(West) (codified as amended at TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.11(a)(3), (g) (Vernon 2005)). Texas
houses over 171,000 prisoners. HARRISON & BECK, supra note 1, at 3 tbl.2 (reporting data as of June
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has done, ' addresses the reality that tobacco smuggling can appeal to
prison staff' 4 and helps to control any black market activity."5
Moreover, smoking policies designed to restrict or ban smoking do not
themselves generally implicate constitutional rights.' 16 At least three circuits
have concluded there is no Eighth Amendment right to smoke in prison, re-
jecting the proposition that prison officials could inflict "cruel and unusual
punishment" on smoker inmates by instituting a generally applicable smoking
ban. ' 7 First Amendment challenges are also likely to fail, including claims
that prison officials must exempt smoking in religious ceremonies, such as
those traditionally conducted by Native Americans,"' and that smoking in
prison is "sufficiently expressive" to be protected under the First Amend-
ment." 9
Ill. REMEDYING THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT VIOLATION
In light of the gravity of the risk associated with continued exposure to
SHS and the unreasonableness of failing to address it with an effective
smoking ban, courts should remedy Eighth Amendment violations resulting
from SHS. Achieving a real remedy will require a willingness by courts to
30, 2005). Yet, from 2003 to 2006, an average of only forty-six cases of tobacco smuggling were
opened each year by the prison system's Office of Inspector General, which investigates employee
misconduct. Telephone Interview with John Moriarty, Inspector Gen., Tex. Dep't of Criminal Jus-
tice, in Austin, Tex. (Jan. 23, 2007).
113. T x. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.1 l(a)(3), (g) (Vernon 2005).
114. Steven Patrick & Robert Marsh, Current tobacco policies in U.S. adult male prisons, 38
Soc. Sci. J. 27, 34 (2001) (predicting that, where a prison has turned tobacco into contraband, easy,
legal access to tobacco outside prison walls will cause prison staff to consider smuggling for the first
time).
115. Some positive effects may offset problems posed by tobacco smuggling. An increase in
tobacco smuggling may bring with it a desirable "sharp decline in contraband including other
drugs." Id. at 33. Corrections officials have reported that they prefer tobacco to alternative smug-
gling activities. Martin Horn, Commissioner of the New York City Department of Correction,
suggested that he would "rather be chasing tobacco than drugs." Zoroya, supra note 100. A senior
Texas corrections official echoed this sentiment. See Tomaso, supra note 70.
116. Grass v. Sargent, 903 F.2d 1206, 1207 (8th Cir. 1990) (affirming the dismissal of an
Eighth Amendment challenge to Alabama's restriction of smoking in the prison visitation area).
117. E.g., Mauchlin v. Hood, 167 F. App'x 735, 736 (10th Cir. 2006); Beauchamp v. Sullivan,
21 F.3d 789, 790-91 (7th Cir. 1994) (suggesting that the sudden withdrawal of an addictive sub-
stance could be employed as torture by police or guards but that a generalized policy addressing the
risk of harm could not be unconstitutional, especially in light of the Supreme Court's ruling in Hel-
ling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993)); Grass, 903 F.2d at 1207.
118. Cf Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990)
(rejecting the proposition that religious beliefs excuse an individual from the need to comply with an
"otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate"). Nevertheless, some
states exclude religious ceremonies from their smoking bans. See, e.g., COLO. DEP'T OF CORR., REG.
No. 800-01K, AMERICAN INDIAN EXCEPTION TO TOBACCO BAN (2006) (exempting American
Indian pipe ceremonies from the inmate smoking ban); KAN. DEP'T OF CORR., POLICY MEMORAN-
DUM ISSUANCE No. 06-03-001 (2006), available at http://docnet.dc.state.ks.usIMPPs/Chapter9/
09107.pdf (describing an exception for religious ceremonies).
119. See House of Corr. Block Representatives Comm. v. Creamer, No. CIV. A. 97-6822,
1998 WL 242663, at * I (E.D. Pa. Apr. 30, 1998) (granting summary judgment to defendants on First
Amendment claim).
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acknowledge evolving standards of decency and the seriousness of the risk of
harm posed by SHS. Achieving a remedy will further require courts to address
the reality that inmates frequently lack the resources necessary to meet the
burden of production in SHS cases.' 20 Lower courts should heed the Supreme
Court's instruction that courts reviewing Eighth Amendment claims must be
open to evidence and assistance from many sources, including expert testi-
mony and studies as to how particular conditions will affect prisoners.' This
Part contends that courts are empowered to remedy an Eighth Amendment
violation stemming from SHS by easing the burden of production confronting
inmate plaintiffs and by ordering increasingly broad injunctive relief until the
constitutional harm is averted.
Courts, by taking judicial notice of appropriate facts and by ordering test-
ing to document the plaintiff's exposure, can partially address the common
inability of inmates to document the serious harm confronting them. Courts
can also notice commonly accepted facts,
22 such as the health risks of SHS
12
1
and society's acts expressing intolerance to SHS. '4 Courts can further ease the
burden by ordering testing of the plaintiff's urine for cotinine, a valid marker
120. See Gizzi, supra note 21, at 1122 (arguing that scientific evidence may not be readily avail-
able to inmates without access to funds); Matthew H. Kraft, Case Note. Second Hand Smoke as Cruel
and Unusual Punishment: Helling v. McKinney: The Insurmountable Burden of Proof and the Role of
the Court, 3 GEO. MASON INDEP. L. REV. 257, 277 (1994) (arguing that the Helling burden of proof
demands many more "studies and financial resources than any inmate is likely to have").
121. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 363 (1981).
122. FED. R. EvID. 201(b) ('A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dis-
pute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2)
capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questioned:"); see Denis v. N.Y State Dep't of Corr. Servs., No. 05 Civ. 4495 LAK AJP, 2006 WL
217926, at *20 (S.D.N.Y Jan. 30, 2006) (Mag. Rep. & Recommendation) (taking judicial notice of
smoking bans in New York City bars, restaurants, and public buildings, and in over 2000 American
cities, in support of conclusion that society's tolerance of exposure to SHS has "decreased signifi-
cantly" since Helling), enforced by 2006 WL 406313 (S.D.N.Y Feb. 22, 2006). Judicial notice
effectively acts as a substitute for evidence, dispensing with formal proof of the fact. RONALD L. CARL-
SON, EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, & EDWARD J. KIONKA, EVIDENCE IN THE NINETIES 1009 (3d ed.
1991). Judicial notice is appropriate for "well-known medical facts." Hines v. Sec'y of the Dep't of
Health & Human Servs., 940 F.2d 1518, 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (citing Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Wil-
liam J. Champion & Co., 350 F2d 115, 130 (6th Cir. 1965) (noticing the fact that cancer does not
manifest itself quickly)) (affirming judicial notice of the incubation period of measles).
123. Cf Fisher v. Caruso, No. 03-CV-71804-DT, 2006 WL 2711807, at *12 (E.D. Mich. Sept.
21, 2006) (noticing that the surgeon general concluded that ventilation is insufficient to address the
health risks posed by SHS). A court can notice that it is common knowledge that SHS can have serious
negative health consequences. A court can also notice that the surgeon general has concluded that SHS
can amplify the risk of contracting lung cancer, heart disease, and other serious diseases. Even if a court
is unwilling to treat the 2006 Surgeon General Report's conclusions as irrefutable by taking notice of its
contents, a court may still notice the report's authenticity so it may be admitted into evidence. Federal
Rule of Evidence 803(8) provides an exception to hearsay restrictions on the admissibility of evidence.
FED. R. EVID. 803(8) (indicating that the hearsay rule does not exclude "[rjecords, reports, statements,
or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the
office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there
was a duty to report").
124. The Surgeon General Report documents legislative and regulatory policy responses to SHS.
See 2006 SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 571-650.
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of exposure to SHS.' 25 Courts can also appoint an independent expert 126 in
cases where cotinine levels are not sufficiently egregious as to make incontro-
vertible the existence of objective harm'27 and can impose any associated costs
on the defendants. 28 Although the cumulative effect of such judicial acts will
not eliminate inmates' burdens of production, these steps will help to ensure
that legitimate claims are fully considered on their merits.
Once a plaintiff proves an ongoing Eighth Amendment violation relating
to SHS, courts should order appropriate injunctive relief. While compensatory
damages are the presumptive remedy for constitutional violations,' 29 damages
are especially difficult to collect in future harm actions. Likely barriers in-
clude the Eleventh Amendment, 30 qualified immunity,'3' and a requirement
125. Cotinine is a metabolite of nicotine. Id. at 101. Courts have previously ordered air-quality
testing in order to determine a plaintiff's exposure to SHS. E.g., Tudor v. Moore, No. 2:98-1927-RBH,
slip op. at 3 (D.S.C. Aug 31, 2001) (describing July 23, 2001 order requiring defendants to conduct air-
quality testing around the plaintiff's cell). Courts have also examined cotinine concentrations as an
indicator of exposure. E.g., McIntyre v. Robinson, 126 F Supp. 2d 394, 404 (D. Md. 2000). A judicial
order requiring cooperation from prison officials can minimize the challenges of obtaining an accurate
specimen in a prison environment. If a court orders prison officials to collect the urine sample, the order
should be tailored to achieve test results reflecting the normal prison environment. In support of this
goal, the court would ideally select a testing date and communicate it to the parties with only minimal
advance notice. The court could also require that prison officials certify they will not change their en-
forcement of any smoking policy from the time they receive the notice until the testing occurs.
126. FED. R. EVID. 706 ("The court may appoint any expert witnesses agreed upon by the par-
ties, and may appoint expert witnesses of its own selection.").
127. Before Helling reached the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit recommended that the district
court appoint one or more expert witnesses upon remand in order to aid the court's determination as to
whether the risk posed by the plaintiff's exposure to SHS was serious enough to implicate the Eighth
Amendment. McKinney 1, supra note 54, 924 F2d 1500, 1511 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated on other
grounds sub nom. Helling v. McKinney, 502 U.S. 903 (1991). Acknowledging the "complexity of the
scientific evidence," the Ninth Circuit concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to the benefit of the
district court exercising its discretion to appoint an expert who could provide the court with scientific
information on the health effects of SHS and the concentration of SHS in the prison. McKinney v.
Anderson (McKinney 11), 959 F2d 853, 854 (9th Cir. 1992), aff'd sub nom. Helling v. McKinney, 509
U.S. 25 (1993).
128. A number of circuits have recognized that Federal Rule of Evidence 706(b) grants discre-
tion to district courts as to how to apportion the costs of expert witnesses, which includes the authority
to impose the costs on the prison officials. See, e.g., Ledford v. Sullivan, 105 F.3d 354, 360-61 (7th Cir.
1997); McKinney 1, supra note 54, 924 F.2d at 1511; see also FED. R. EvID. 706(b) ("In other civil
actions and proceedings the compensation shall be paid by the parties in such proportion and at such
time as the court directs, and thereafter charged in like manner as other costs."). The Seventh Circuit,
for example, rejected a narrow reading of Rule 706(b) that would have prevented a district court from
appointing an expert witness whenever one of the parties is indigent, notwithstanding that an expert's
testimony would substantially aid the court. Ledford, 105 F.3d at 361.
129. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257-58 (1978) (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.
409, 442 (1976) (White, J., concurring)) (noting a lack of evidence that Congress intended to deter
constitutional violations by means more formidable than compensatory damages).
130. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Eleventh Amendment to stand for the proposition
that federal courts lack jurisdiction over suits by individuals against a state in the absence of the state's
consent. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S.
1, 15 (1890)); see also U.S. CoNsT. amend. XI. "[Iimplementation of state policy or custom may be
reached in federal court only because official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as
actions against the state." Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985).
131. A defendant official, sued in a personal capacity, may be entitled to qualified immunity
when relying on an objectively reasonable interpretation of existing law. Graham, 473 U.S. at 166-67.
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that any award not be speculative.' Consequently, injunctive relief will be
more likely to vindicate an inmate plaintiff's rights. The Supreme Court has
held that a district court's equitable powers are broad once the plaintiff has
proven a constitutional violation, because "breadth and flexibility are inher-
ent in equitable remedies."'33 The Court has indicated that the remedy must
nevertheless be "limited to the inadequacy that produced the injury."' 34 The
Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 has codified these limitations on pro-
spective relief affecting prisons, 3 5 requiring such relief to be narrowly
drawn, to extend no further than necessary, and to be the least intrusive rem-
edy possible. 136 Further, the Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that
courts give "substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the
operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief."'
' 37
Before considering injunctive relief, courts may give defendant prison138
officials the opportunity to remedy the harm. The Supreme Court has indi-
cated that district courts may properly exercise their discretion by permitting
prison officials time to "rectify the situation" before granting prospective
relief. 9 As one commentator has observed, inviting a self-remedy "relies
upon the significant expertise of the defendant in managing its own organi-
zation," thereby satisfying separation of powers concerns.40
Implementing a complete ban on inmate smoking will cure the constitu-
tional violation. Even if a complete ban is not a perfect remedy, 4' prison
officials who regularly enforce a complete ban are no longer deliberately
Although Helling clearly established that deliberate indifference to an unreasonable risk of harm
stemming from SHS states a claim, see Alvarado v. Litscher, 267 F3d 648, 653 (7th Cir. 2001),
qualified immunity may bar damages until courts in each circuit have found Eighth Amendment
violations based on the unreasonable risk of harm from SHS and have further defined the contours of
both "deliberate indifference" and "unreasonableness" in the SHS context, cf Mills v. Clark, No. 99-
6334, 2000 WL 1250781, at *3 (4th Cir. Sept. 5, 2000) (reversing denial of summary judgment to
defendants on the basis that qualified immunity will protect superintendents in situations where a
prisoner's exposure to SHS is not clearly unreasonably high).
132. While significant evidence documents the increased risk of serious disease posed by
SHS, see supra Part I, it may prove impossible for a fact finder to accurately estimate a plaintiff's
damages from an increased risk of developing lung cancer, heart disease, or other serious maladies.
133. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687 n.9 (1978) (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971)) (affirming a thirty day limit placed by the district court on
confinement in isolation cells after the court found that conditions of confinement violated the
Eighth Amendment).
134. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996).
135. 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (2006).
136. Id. § 3626(a)(1).
137. Id.
138. E.g., Hadix v. Caruso, No. 4:92-CV- 110, 2005 WL 2671289, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 19,
2005) (describing the court's past instructions that the defendant self-remedy an ongoing constitu-
tional violation).
139. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 846-47 (1994) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
562 (1979) (warning courts against becoming "enmeshed in the minutiae of prison operations")).
140. Tracy A. Thomas, The Prophylactic Remedy: Normative Principles and Definitional
Parameters of Broad Injunctive Relief, 52 BuFF. L. REv. 301, 354 (2004).
141. See supra notes 112-115 and accompanying text (discussing tobacco smuggling).
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indifferent. Gradually phasing in a complete ban, rather than implement-
ing the ban immediately, could achieve two worthy objectives: increasing
the efficacy of an eventual ban and minimizing disciplinary concerns.
14
1
If prison officials identify any remedy other than a complete ban on
smoking,'" a court could adopt a minimum air-quality standard to determine
the adequacy of that remedy.4 4 Federal outdoor air standards, although not a
perfect measure of the impact of SHS indoors, would help courts define
constitutional limits on exposure to SHS.'4 The Environmental Protection
Agency has established National Ambient Air Quality Standards
("Standards"), which restrict atmospheric pollutants, including fine particulate
matter. 41 Pollution from SHS includes "respirable particles," which are
equivalent to particulate matter.14 The federal Air Quality Index ("Index"),'
9
which incorporates the Standards, assigns various levels of particulate matter
into categories ranging from good to unhealthy to very hazardous.5
Applying a model that may be especially helpful in environments such as
prisons, Professor Repace recently used the Index to assess the indoor
142. Prison officials will not be deliberately indifferent if they respond reasonably to a risk of
harm, Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844, and regularly enforcing a complete ban on smoking is arguably the
most reasonable response available to prison officials.
143. A delay could afford time for prison officials to educate prisoners and staff about a pend-
ing ban and to offer smoking-cessation assistance to make the transition easier on smokers.
144. Altemative remedies proposed by prison officials might include implementing an indoor
ban on smoking where none exists, supplementing an indoor ban on smoking with a ban on possess-
ing tobacco indoors, or increasing efforts directed at enforcing an existing policy.
145. See Thomas, supra note 140, at 355. Setting an air-quality standard rather than initially
requiring a specific policy will allow prison officials the flexibility to implement a policy of their
choice, as long as the court determines the policy will alleviate the constitutional harm. See Sandin
v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483 (1995) (noting that state officials' flexibility in the fine tuning of the
ordinary incidents of prison life is especially warranted).
146. Although the creation of a new air-quality standard would fall outside the judiciary's
institutional competence, courts are competent to apply a standard previously promulgated by a
regulatory agency to determine whether prison officials have abated an unreasonable risk of harm.
Cf. Harris v. James, 127 F.3d 993, 1011 n.24 (11 th Cir. 1997) (noting that courts can look to regula-
tions to flesh out the precise contours of specific rights in order to make them judicially
enforceable).
147. Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 283 F.3d 355, 358-59 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (noting that the
EPA must set primary National Ambient Air Quality Standards at levels necessary to protect the
public health). Fine particulate matter consists of "solid particles and liquid droplets found in air"
with diameters "between 2.5 and 10 micrometers." Id. at 359.
148. See James Repace, Elizabeth Hughes, & Neal Benowitz, Exposure to second-hand smoke
air pollution assessed frm bar patrons'urinary cotinine, 8 NICOTINE & TOBACCO REs. 701, 701-02
(2006).
149. AIRNow, Air Quality Index: A Guide to Air Quality and Your Health, http://
airnow.gov/index.cfm?action=aqibroch.aqi#2 (last visited Mar 30, 2007) (indicating that an Index
value of 100 generally corresponds to the Standards level set by the EPA to protect public health).
150. Repace et al., supra note 148, at 702. Although the Index does not perfectly capture the
risks of SHS, a mixture which also comprises nonparticulate matter, see supra text accompanying
note 25, the Index offers courts a regulatory benchmark to inform their determinations as to whether
a particular action plan will remedy the constitutional violation.
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effects of SHS.'5 The court can appoint an independent expert to assist with
implementing an air-quality standard.'52
Where a plaintiff's cotinine levels show continued exposure to seriously
harmful levels of SHS, even after a remedy adopted by the prison has taken
full effect, a court will be justified in ordering defendants to implement a
more aggressive smoking policy. For example, where a prison has imposed
only an indoor ban on smoking, a court may reasonably find that the ability
of inmates to possess tobacco indoors bears a sufficient causal relationship'
to the potentially harmful levels of SHS that completely banning smoking
on prison grounds will be the only effective remedy to the constitutional
violation.
While critics may observe that imposing a prison smoking ban is an ac-
tion that traditionally falls squarely within the executive or legislative
domain, courts are empowered to take such remedial measures where de-
fendants systemically fail to redress a constitutional violation. 54 Broad
injunctive relief is traditionally necessary only as a last resort, 5 but if the
court concludes from the record that no less intrusive remedy would suf-
fice, 56 it is empowered to require prison officials to adopt a complete
151. Repace et al., supra note 148, at 701 ("smoking in bars produces levels of personal air
pollution for bar patrons that merit air pollution alerts when sustained in the outdoor air"). The
Repace study used urinary cotinine levels to determine that the respirable particle levels in three
bars fell in the "unhealthy" range under the Index. Id. at 709. The Reilly court described Professor
Repace as an expert on the effects of SHS. Reilly v. Grayson, 157 F. Supp. 2d 762, 766 (E.D. Mich.
2001), aff'd, 310 F.3d 519 (6th Cir. 2002).
152. See, e.g., Hadix v. Caruso, No. 4:92-CV- 110, 2005 WL 2671289, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Oct.
19, 2005) (referencing the court's appointment of a medical monitor to advise on the implementa-
tion of remedies in light of premature and possibly avoidable deaths stemming from inadequate
prison medical care). A preliminary determination will be which Index category, for example, un-
healthy or very hazardous, to adopt as the air-quality standard. See AIRNow, supra note 149. The
long-term nature of inmates' exposure suggests that even "moderate" levels of particulate matter
will pose an unreasonable risk in the prison context, but that decision will lie with the court after
hearing from the parties and experts. To monitor the defendants' compliance with the air-quality
standard effectively, the affected facility will need to be randomly tested until the court determines
that the constitutional violation no longer exists. Because ventilation systems carry SHS around the
facility, see supra note 30 and accompanying text, and because it is conceivable that the inmate-
plaintiff may be exposed to SHS while moving around the facility, monitoring compliance with the
air-quality standard throughout the entire prison is likely the least intrusive means of addressing the
harm.
153. See Thomas, supra note 140, at 309 (noting that, while a court's ability to impose broad
injunctive relief reaching defendant's affiliated legal conduct beyond the illegal action itself is not
unlimited, such relief has been upheld where the "enjoining of affiliated conduct is necessary to
achieve the aim of remedying an illegality"). This necessity may exist where there is "a sufficient
causal nexus to the legal harm," which a plaintiff can demonstrate by showing "that the affiliated
conduct shares a corresponding factual issue with the illegality and that the relationship is suffi-
ciently close to justify its inclusion in the relief as measured by common notions of foreseeability
and proximate cause." Id.
154. See id. at 381. The Prison Litigation Reform Act does not bar even broad remedies when
they are "necessary" to vindicate a plaintiff's rights. Id. at 371.
155. Id. at 311.
156. Id. (arguing that a judge may not completely invent a prophylactic remedy but rather
must seek inputs on the remedial question and then confine the result to the record).
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smoking and possession ban. 5 7 As one judge has noted, extensive court-
ordered relief is necessary and proper where a defendant exhibits "a stub-
born and perverse resistance to change.'
5 8
CONCLUSION
Consistent with society's evolving standards of decency, claims that
prison officials are deliberately indifferent to a serious risk of harm posed by
SHS satisfy the Helling v. McKinney standard and warrant a judicial remedy.
As required under Helling, exposure to SHS results in serious risks of harm,
namely contracting lung cancer, heart disease, and other serious medical
problems. Legislative pronouncements manifest society's intolerance to ex-
posing anyone to levels of smoke that commonly exist in prisons lacking
effective bans. Prison officials respond unreasonably to the risk posed by
SHS, and, thus, with deliberate indifference, when they create an environ-
ment susceptible to widespread prisoner abuse by continuing to allow
inmates to possess tobacco. Although inmate plaintiffs may consistently
have been exposed to levels of SHS that satisfy the Helling standard, many
lower courts have dismissed their allegations of significant, long-term expo-
sure to SHS or granted summary judgment to defendant prison officials.
Despite recognition by prison officials that exposure to SHS poses an unrea-
sonable risk of harm to inmates, twenty-one states have failed to address the
risk through a complete ban on inmate smoking. Although legislatures in the
remaining states might eventually ban smoking in prisons, the Eighth
Amendment requires courts to redress constitutional deficiencies at the time
they exist. Responding to the gravity of the risk posed by SHS and the lack
of resources available to many pro se inmates, courts can ease inmates' bur-
dens of production by taking judicial notice of appropriate medical facts as
well as society's restrictions on SHS. Courts are empowered to require, once
a violation has been proven, that defendants adopt increasingly restrictive
smoking policies until the constitutional harm is averted.
157. Requiring a complete smoking ban should not be perceived as granting additional rights
to the plaintiff, as it would merely ensure practical enforcement of an existing right by clearly in-
forming the defendant of expected behavior. See id. at 382.
158. Id. at 381 (quoting Honorable William Wayne Justice, Address at George Washington
University National Law Center: The Two Faces of Judicial Activism (Mar. 10, 1992), in 61 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1, 7 (1992)).
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